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In recent months unemployment within the EU has 
made the headlines, especially in September of last year, 
when it passed 25 million mark, which is 11.6% of the EU 
labour force. There were marked differences across the 
Union with Germany and its neighbours Luxembourg, 
Austria and The Netherlands around 5%, while in Spain 
and Greece it passed hitherto unthinkable levels of 25%, 
and with every sign of further increases to come.
Judging by the media coverage, one might get the 
impression that this is a recent and sudden phenomenon, 
a further fall-out from the Western ﬁnancial crisis of the 
2008-9, and of the eurozone fiscal crisis that followed. 
This is very far from the truth. Unemployment has been 
a chronic problem for the EU from the very beginning of 
the Single Market in 1993. 
In this article, I will examine comparative and 
historical evidence -from the OECD, the World Bank and 
UNCTAD- in a search for clues as to why this should 
be, but will begin by setting out the framework of the 
investigation and outlining the basic facts.
EU unemployment in a comparative perspective
The peculiarities of the EU can, of course, only be 
seen and analysed in a comparative perspective. In this 
investigation we will compare 12 long-term members 
of the EU with 10 other economies, 9 members of the 
OECD plus Singapore.
?The 12 EU members were selected because they have 
been members since 1986 or earlier, and all 12 have 
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therefore been part of the single market ever since it was 
inaugurated in 1993. If the EU and the single market 
have had any effect on unemployment, then it seems 
likely that it will reveal itself most clearly on those who 
have been long-standing members.   Moreover, the 15 
societies that have joined the EU since 1993 are a rather 
heterogeneous bunch which includes many former 
socialist societies whose labour markets and employment 
rates might still be affected by factors arising from their 
transition to market economies. German reuniﬁcation in 
1991 means, of course, that such extraneous factors may 
not have been entirely excluded from this comparison.
The 10 non-EU economies in the world with which 
they are compared are those which seem to be most 
similar- in terms of their labour market institutions and 
productivity- to those of the EU 12. A number of OECD 
countries, Mexico, Turkey, Chile and others have therefore 
been excluded on the grounds that they are industrializing 
or newly industrialized, economies with significantly 
less developed labour markets than the EU 12. Three of 
these 10 non-EU countries -Switzerland, Norway and 
Iceland- are European, but opted by referenda to remain 
independent. They are therefore of particular interest 
in any attempt to identify the impact of the EU, since 
comparison with them provide the best chance, indeed the 
only chance, of distinguishing European characteristics 
from EU ones.  They are, however, only a small 
proportion of the total labour force or population of the 
10 independent countries, and their peculiarities may be 
easily swamped in weighted means of the group as whole. 
They are therefore distinguished from the other 7 non-EU 
countries in the comparisons that follow.
The EU?s record of unemployment
Figure 1 compares the rates of unemployment over 
the nineteen years from 1993 to 2011 of 12 EU members 
with 9 other OECD member countries, plus Singapore.
The graph presents the weighted means of the rate 
of unemployment in the three groups of countries over 
the years 1993-2010. It shows first of all that the 12 
EU countries have had a significantly higher rate of 
unemployment than the 10 independent countries, though 
the rate of the latter rose towards the higher EU rates at 
the turn of the century, and then quite sharply in 2008-9. 
The contrast between the unemployment rate of the EU 12 
and the three independent European countries is still more 
marked. The EU 12 rate has been more than double that of 
these three countries in every year but one -2005. This 
comparison does not therefore support the idea that there 
is that there is a peculiarly European high unemployment 
proﬁle. High unemployment seems to be a distinctive and 
enduring EU characteristic, not a European one.
Weighted means of groups will, of course, hide 
variations within groups, and these may best be seen 
in the full chart of all the data from which this graph 
is drawn attached at the end of this article. Some EU 
countries have had unemployment rates equal to, or 
lower than, the mean of the ten independent countries: 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands in 12 of the 19 years, 
and Denmark in eight of the 19 years- but these are a 
deviant minority - of just over 6 per cent of the total 
labour force of the EU 12. Other EU countries have 
also equalled or been below the mean of independent 
countries in a few years. Portugal did so in six, the UK in 
ﬁve, Ireland in three and Germany just once. In all, in 48 
of the 228 individual years measured, EU members have 
had unemployment rates equal to or lower than the mean 
rate of the ten independent countries. These years are 
shaded in the full table in the Appendix.
Deviance on the other side -meaning one of the 10 
independent countries having an unemployment rate 
equal to, or higher than, the mean rate of the EU 12- is 
far less common. Clear blue water separates them from 
the EU over most of this period, the exceptions being 
Australia and Canada in 1993, and the United States, in 
2009 and 2010. Considering this data as a whole, however, 
could reasonably lead one to think that these two groups 
of countries have been run by different principles or on 
separate tracks over these 18 years. At first glance, it is 
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difficult to think of anything that distinguishes them as 
groups other than membership of the EU.
We can delve a little further into these ﬁgures by comparing 
the rates of long-term unemployment in the 12 EU countries 
with the nine of the independent countries for which data is 
available, that is over the years 2000 to 2010. The results are 
given in Table 1. Long-term unemployment is here deﬁned 
as being unemployed for a year or more, and is expressed in 
the middle column of the table as the proportion of the total 
unemployed in the two groups of countries.
The proportion in the EU 12 is slightly more than 
double the proportion in the 9 independent countries, 
reinforces the impression that we are dealing with some 
fundamentally different set of economies. True, Japan 
and Switzerland are higher than a few EU countries, and 
both Denmark and the UK have lower proportions of 
long term unemployment than both of them. However, 
not a single EU country, not even Denmark, is below the 
weighted mean of the 9 independent countries, and not 
a single independent country, not even Japan, reaches 
the mean of the EU 12, a rather remarkable contrast. The 
EU has, we may say, not only suffered from a higher rate 
of unemployment than independent countries, but its 
unemployment has been doubly severe.
The third column in the table gives the proportion 
of the long-term unemployed who might be especially 
scarred by this unpleasant experience, the 15-24 
age cohort. It is of a similar overall magnitude as 
the proportion for all ages, but there are noteworthy 
variations within the two groups. Among the 9 
independent countries, the contrast between Korea 
and Japan is astonishing. Korea has very few long-
term unemployed anyway, and only a tiny fraction of 
them are 15-24 year olds. In sharp contrast, nearly a 
third of the Japanese unemployed are long-term, nearly 
a quarter of 15-24 year olds have experienced it, even 
OECD Stat database Unemployment rate Key Tables from OECD, No. 1.doi: 10.1787/unemp-table-2012-1-en
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Korea 1.35 0.95
Japan 31.62 22.67
NZ 10.95 4.78
Australia 19.69 11.96
US 12.07 7.81
Canada 9.32 3.06
Norway 8.07 1.93
Iceland 10.51 3.22
Switzerland 32.54 n/a
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Netherlands 27.08 10.90
Luxembourg 26.66 18.13
Denmark 18.63 4.64
UK 24.35 14.78
Ireland* 33.05 23.43
Portugal 44.02 25.84
Belgium 49.55 28.40
Italy 52.45 47.77
Germany 51.19 27.39
France 38.63 23.64
Greece 50.74 43.08
Spain 36.19 25.89
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OECD iLibrary, ? Labour Market Statistics: Unemployment by 
duration?, Employment and Labour Market Statistics (database).
doi: 10.1787/data-00320-en
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though the mean rate of unemployment rate is rather 
low, 4.68%.  The U.S. proﬁle is also distinctive. It has a 
relatively high unemployment rate by comparison with 
other independent countries, but this is combined with a 
relatively low proportion of long-term unemployment. 
This combination is consistent with the widely-held view 
that the U.S. has rather responsive labour markets, with 
employers who are quick to ﬁre, but also quick to hire.
The proportions of the 15-24 age group suffering long-
term unemployment in the EU 12 are more than twice as 
high as that of the 9 independent countries –a startling and 
appalling statistic. Getting on for half of young Italian men 
and women have had this wretched experience, as have 
43% of young Greeks. In six other EU countries -France, 
Germany, Spain, Ireland, Belgium and Portugal - around a 
quarter of young people have endured it.
When considering the overall rate of unemployment 
we identiﬁed a deviant minority within the EU, deﬁned as 
those EU countries that have as good a record as that of the 
average independent country. When we consider long term 
unemployment this deviant minority has shrunk. Taking 
all ages together, there is not a single EU country that has 
as low a rate of long-term employment as the mean of the 
9 independent countries, and when we look at the 15-24 
age group amongst them only one country has as low a 
proportion as the mean of independent countries –Denmark.
Overall, we can draw one clear conclusion this data: 
the EU has been for these 19 years a club of high and 
severe unemployment, with 15-24 year olds especially 
hard hit by long-term unemployment.
How might the problem be explained? 
The data presented merely identify a striking and 
unpleasant characteristic of the EU and tells us nothing at 
all, of course, about why this should be so.  What are the 
possible explanations for the differences between the EU 
and independent countries?
It seems unlikely that they could be due to the national 
economic policies of member countries, and that while the 
10 independent countries just happen to have managed their 
economies competently over these 18 years, the EU 12, or 
most of them, have been consistently inept. Likewise, it 
seems unlikely that the EU?s unemployment could be due to 
global competition, or shifting patterns of world trade, since 
the 10 independent countries were subject to these forces as 
much as the EU member countries.
One is therefore obliged to consider whether the 
explanation lies within the EU itself. This causal link 
might, of course, run in either direction. Perhaps  the 
three European countries opted by referenda to remain 
outside the EU precisely because their unemployment 
rates were consistently low, and that EU has therefore 
tended to attract those countries suffering either from high 
unemployment, or from the fear of high unemployment. 
This latter fearful category might include the British, 
who entered at a time of relatively low unemployment, 
but when many observers were deeply depressed by the 
failures of British manufacturing industry.
Apart from the fact, that it would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to get comparative data about the fear of 
unemployment to test this argument, it does not appear 
to be a plausible explanation on other grounds. Even if 
fear of unemployment was a telling factor in the British 
case, and real unemployment signiﬁcant in others, they 
do not appear to have propelled the original six EU 
members. Fear of a resurgent Germany, or the noble ideal 
of transcending national rivalries and conflicts, and the 
not-so-noble idea of Europe recovering its proper status 
in the world, seem to have been rather more compelling 
considerations. In any case, high unemployment was not 
a problem in the early years of the EU. On the contrary, 
in the 1960s the ?miracle ? of low unemployment in 
Europe was commonly discussed.1 Moreover, the three 
deviant countries with the lowest rates of unemployment 
within the EU have remained among the most ardent 
drivers of ever closer union to this day.
It seems more likely therefore to that the causal 
relationship runs in the other direction, and therefore 
to ask whether membership of the EU entails costs and 
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obligations that have had a consistently adverse impact 
on the level of employment in most of its member 
countries. Is the level of unemployment consistently 
lower in independent countries because they are without 
these costs, restraints and obligations of EU membership?
Is the EU itself the cause of the high unemployment 
rates of its members?
One must ﬁrst observe that this is a reasonable question 
or hypothesis in the sense that the scope, scale and duration 
of EU costs and obligations, seem sufficient to have had 
a generally adverse impact on the level of employment 
over the long run. The scope or range of EU regulation 
is comprehensive, and touches every single industry and 
service in its member countries, and not infrequently entails 
micro-regulation of an intrusive and expensive kind.  Hence 
it might well have had an impact across entire economies.
Measuring the scale of the costs this involves to 
employers is a difficult task, and one which has hardly 
begun. The most recent, as well as by far the most 
thorough and comprehensive effort, is that of Tim 
Congdon on the UK.2 After reviewing all the earlier 
attempts, and citing a vast range of evidence, he ﬁnally 
estimated that EU membership cost the UK about ?150b 
per annum in 2012, or 10 per cent of its GDP.
The only ?official ? figure available is the European 
Commission?s estimate of the administrative costs of its 
own regulations. Its Better Regulation website observes that 
?According to estimates it would be feasible to reduce 
administrative costs by as much as 25% by 2012. This 
would have a signiﬁcant economic impact on EU economy 
- an increase in the level of GDP of about 1.5% or around €
150 billion.?3 If 25% of the administrative costs amount to €
150 billion and about 1.5% of GDP, then we may reasonably 
infer, by the EU's own estimates, that its total administrative 
costs are €600b per annum and about 6% of GDP of the EU.
Reconciling these, and other, attempts to quantify the 
total and regulatory costs with one another, producing time 
series of them, measuring their net impact on employment 
over time, not forgetting the beneficial impact in net 
recipient countries, and then offsetting them against the 
regulatory costs that member countries would have incurred 
were they not members of the EU, would be a formidable 
task, and for that reason will probably not be completed in 
the near future. For the moment, we might say that, if the 
EU itself is somewhere near the truth in estimating its own 
costs and their impact on the EU?s GDP, then it seems safe 
to say they are on a scale that could signiﬁcantly depress the 
level of employment in member countries.
EU costs and obligations also qualify as a possible 
explanation of its member?s high rate of unemployment 
in terms of their duration. One of the more curious aspects 
the high rate of EU unemployment is that it has continued 
for 19 years, fluctuating no doubt because of changes 
in government policies in member countries, or in the 
European or world economy, but continuing nonetheless 
consistently above that of the 10 independent countries, 
and far above that of independent European countries. 
Hence any adequate explanation of the cause of this 
disparity must be equally consistent and continuous. EU 
costs and obligations also qualify on that score. They 
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have been consistent and continuous.
We may therefore conclude that we have an eminently 
plausible hypothesis that the costs and obligations of EU 
membership are the reason why the unemployment rate of 
the EU has been higher than that of 10 independent countries. 
And it is, difficult to think of anything else that, in scope, 
scale and duration, has distinguished these 12 EU countries 
from the 10 independent ones over the past 19 years.  
Limitations of the available evidence 
Although it is plausible, testing or proving this 
hypothesis is quite another matter. To do so, we would 
ideally like to isolate and measure the additional costs 
and obligations that the EU has already imposed on 
employers within the single market, alongside the 
equivalent costs of domestic regulation in a group of 
comparable independent countries, so that we might 
then compare their impact on employment, Without 
such a comparison, an adequate evaluation of the 
hypothesis is not possible. But no comparative data of 
this kind has ever been collected. Neither, the Swiss cost/
beneﬁt analysis, nor Congdon?s study, nor any of those 
mentioned in it, extend to comparative data from other 
EU and non-EU countries.
Since 2003 the European Commission has itself made 
some attempts to measure, individually, the costs of all 
its proposals, directives and regulations on its members 
by means of impact assessments of all regulations and 
directives. By February 2012, it had produced 696 of 
them, but impact assessments tend, naturally enough, to 
be ad hoc, addressing the speciﬁc proposal before them. 
They do not provide systematic, comparative evidence.
There is therefore no untapped store of data awaiting 
those who want to discover exactly what the impact 
of the EU might be on the level of employment in 
its member countries by comparing it with those of 
independent countries that are not subject to the same 
costs and obligations. It is unlikely that the EU itself will 
provide such data in the foreseeable future. The letter 
addressed to the President of European Council and the 
European Commission by 12 heads of government of 
member countries on the 20th February 2012 included the 
modest request that the Commission ?publish an annual 
statement identifying and explaining the total net cost to 
business of regulatory proposals issued in the preceding 
year.?4 Press reports suggested that both Presidents 
ignored the letter, but even if they had acted instantly on 
the request, it would only have provided evidence from 
2012, told us nothing about the accumulated costs over 
the past 40 years or more, and nothing of course about 
the equivalent costs in independent countries.
The absence of such critical evidence means that the 
hypothesis cannot be tested. The best we can do is to 
examine the available historical cross-national data about 
these 22 economies that measure regulatory, institutional 
and behavioural variables akin to those that the EU 
imposes on its members, and see whether they are related 
to the level of unemployment in these economies. If 
they are, this will not prove the hypothesis is correct, 
but it will add reliable empirical support, and therefore 
credibility, to the hypothesis that the costs and obligations 
of EU membership have themselves contributed to its 
unemployment problem.
There are three main sources of such evidence: the 
OECD?s Employment Protection Index, the World Bank's 
Ease of Doing Business index and UNCTAD?s annual 
reports of the ﬂows of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
across the globe, which give the total cumulative stock of 
FDI held by each country at the year's end. 
Employment protection in the EU
It is widely believed that the EU countries have higher 
job security and employment protection than non-members, 
and it is not unreasonable to suppose that these might 
impose costs on employers which could affect the rate of 
unemployment by making them reluctant to hire when they 
know it is difﬁcult to ﬁre. So it seems appropriate to begin 
by examining the OECD Employment Protection Index 
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since this measures individual and collective dismissal 
procedures, both for full-time and part-time workers, the 
required notice periods and severance pay, whether secured 
by legislation or collective agreements, as well as the 
authorized exemptions therefrom, and compiles them all into 
a single decimal score between 1 and 6 for every country. 
Since the scale is still in the process of development, there is 
at present only one year with a full set of data -2008.5
These protections refer, one must note, to dismissal 
procedures alone, and are therefore a rather limited 
form of labour market regulation compared to those 
employment relationships regulated by the European 
Commission and the European Court, which cover a far 
wider range of issues such as  working time, the posting 
of employees, the transfer of undertakings, maternity 
rights and parental leave, part time and fixed term 
employment, agency workers, protection of employees ? 
personal data, and on works councils and consultation.6 
The OECD measures are used here as a proxy of these 
EU regulations simply because they are the only cross-
national measure of labour regulation, and therefore 
provide the only chance of comparing its impact on 
unemployment in different countries.
The Employment Protection scores of the 21 of the 22 
countries are given in the third column of the Table 3. Most of 
the EU 12, it may be seen, score highly on it: their mean score 
was 2.47 (or weighted by the size of the labour force 2.43). 
That of the 10 non-members (after adding an exaggerated 
notional ﬁgure for Singapore which was not included in the 
OECD ﬁgures) is only 1.64 (and weighted 1.23).7
The contrast can be expressed in terms of the aggregate 
labour forces of the two groups of countries: 8.9% of 
the total labour forces of the 10 independent countries 
work with high employment protection (?high ? meaning 
a score of 2.0 or more) while nearly 80% of the total 
EU 12 labour forces do so. Correspondingly, 91% of the 
aggregate labour forces of the 10 independent countries 
work with low employment protection, while only 20.2% 
of the EU 12 labour forces do so. There is therefore a 
signiﬁcant difference between the independent countries 
and the EU 12 on this index.   How far, we may now ask, 
are these differences in employment protection related to 
differences in their rates of unemployment?
We may first answer this question by measuring the 
correlation between the mean rates of unemployment in 
the 22 countries over the 11 years from 2000 to 2010, with 
????????????????????????????????????????????????
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Unemp 
Rate Mean 
2000-2010
OECD Emp 
Prot?n Index
2008
Scored on 1-6
Singapore 2.6 1.5*
Korea 3.63 2.13
Japan 4.68 1.73
NZ 4.89 1.16
Australia 5.46 1.38
US 5.91 0.85
Canada 7.08 1.02
Norway 3.59 2.65
Iceland 3.62 2.11
Switzerland 3.66 1.77
weighted mean 10 ???? ????
weighted mean 3 ????
Netherlands 3.82 2.23
Luxembourg 3.94 3.39
Denmark 4.85 1.91
UK 5.52 1.09
Ireland 6.10 1.39
Portugal 6.99 2.84
Belgium 7.65 2.61
Italy 8.11 2.58
Germany 8.73 2.63
France 8.75 3.00
Greece 9.85 2.97
Spain 12.11 3.11
weighted mean ???? ????
corr with unemp ?  ?????
?  ?????
Corr with 
long-term unemp ?????
OECD iLibrary (2010) ? Employment protection legislation; 
strictness of employment protection legislation and collective 
dismissals?, Employment & Labour Market Statistics (database)
Doi:10.1787/data-00316-en
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their employment protection scores. The first and most 
appropriate measure, a product moment correlation was 
r0.279, which is hardly enough to make us think we might 
have identiﬁed a signiﬁcant relationship. If we rank the 22 
countries, the rank order correlation jumps to an interesting-
looking p0.410, though ranking standardizes the intervals 
between the countries, and ignores the more precise 
discrimination provided by the rates and OECD scores, so 
there is no reason to pay that much more attention to it.
As with any correlation between two phenomena, it is the 
?outliers? which prevent the relationship being any stronger 
which ﬁrst attract attention. They are easy to spot. Among 
the independent countries, Norway, Korea and Iceland 
stand apart, having rather high employment protection 
scores, but low unemployment rates, and hence achieve 
what is, one imagines, the desired goal of public policy 
almost everywhere. Within the EU, only the Netherlands 
and Luxembourg have managed it, but together, these ﬁve 
countries contradict the notion that there is a direct and 
universal relationship between employment protection and 
unemployment, or that there is an iron, universal law ?when 
it is difﬁcult to ﬁre, employers hesitate to hire?.
Nonetheless, some countries seem to have long believed 
that, whether or not it is true universally, it is true for 
them, and have for that reason been wary of increasing 
employment protection. Seven of the ten independent 
countries fall into this category, and three of the 12 EU 
countries. These three outliers on the EU side -the UK, 
Ireland and Denmark- might reasonably feel justified in 
their stance. Their employment protection scores may 
be low relative to their EU peers, but so also are their 
unemployment rates, again relative to their EU peers.
Another reason for thinking that there is some kind of 
relationship between unemployment and employment 
protection, even if it is not a universal one, is provided 
by the data on long-term unemployment. The product 
moment correlation between employment protection 
and the proportion of the unemployed who have been 
unemployed for a year or more, (minus Singapore 
because no data is available) is r0.537 and of a similar 
magnitude for the 15-24 age group on their own, 
considerably higher in other words than the correlation 
between unemployment as a whole and employment 
protection, and therefore to be taken more seriously. 
This certainly merits further investigation, and raises 
the possibility that, in some way which we do not 
understand, higher employment protection tends to 
increase the duration of unemployment, perhaps by 
reminding employers of the long-term risk inherent in 
hiring and rehiring decisions, or by making a period 
of unemployment on the cv of the applicant more of a 
stigma.
A third reason why it would be premature to dismiss 
the notion that ?when it is difficult to fire, employers 
hesitate to hire?, is that correlations cannot tell us 
whether or not employment protections have a direct 
impact on the level of employment after they cross a 
certain threshold. Employment protections in Spain, 
Italy, Greece and Portugal are still higher than those 
countries which have shown that high employment 
protection is compatible with low unemployment, and 
these four countries have all suffered from consistently 
high unemployment, well above the EU mean.  The 
low overall correlation hardly allows us to dismiss the 
possibility of a causal relationship in these four cases.
The conclusion from this first source of comparative 
evidence is that the employment protections offered 
by most EU members may have some bearing on their 
higher rates of employment, and more probably on long-
term unemployment, but the relationship is neither a 
strong nor a universal one. However, until such time as 
the impact of all EU regulation is measured, we would 
hardly be entitled to dismiss the hypothesis that the 
EU regulation has had an adverse effect on the level of 
employment, simply on the grounds that five countries 
have shown that some moderately high protection, 
as measured by the OECD, are compatible with low 
unemployment.
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The ease of doing business in the EU
Our second source of evidence that might shed some 
light on the peculiarities of the EU 12 is the World Bank?s 
Ease of Doing Business Index. This ranks 183 countries after 
assessing each of them on multiple sub-indices, such as 
the time and cost needed to start a business, to construct 
premises, to get credit, to protect investors and to enforce 
contracts, as well as to hire or dismiss employees. There 
is therefore a slight overlap with the OECD employment 
protection index, though most of the items it includes are 
not currently the subject of EU regulation.
The rankings for the 22 countries in the index for 2012 
are given in column 3 of Table 4. The mean ranking of 
the 10 independent countries, is 10th while that of the 
EU 12 is 37th. The two sets of countries are to put it 
simply, worlds apart! The EU12 have three outstandingly 
poor EU performers by this index, Greece, Italy and 
Luxembourg, though if we omit these three, the mean EU 
ranking rises only to 23rd, so there remains a signiﬁcant 
difference between the two groups of countries. It is, we 
may fairly conclude, generally easier to do business in 
the 10 independent countries than it is in the EU 12.
The rank order correlation between this index and 
the unemployment rankings of the 22 countries is 0.532 
(and the product moment correlation, the rather less 
appropriate measure in this context a similar 0.552). 
Evidently, therefore, this composite World Bank index, 
or some of its constituent sub-indices, get rather closer 
than the employment protections measured by the OECD 
to institutions and behaviour in these societies that may 
affect their rates of unemployment.
Once again, it is the outliers that weaken the correlation 
which attract attention. Among the independent countries, 
they are Switzerland and Japan, both of which are not 
among the easiest places to do business, but nevertheless 
do not have high rates of unemployment. Within the EU 
12, only Luxembourg and the Netherlands, have the same 
combination. The outliers on the EU side are Denmark, 
the UK and Ireland, -the same three countries that were 
outliers in employment protection. They are easy places 
to do business by world standards, and by EU standards, 
have low mean rates of unemployment.
If once again we make the (untested) assumption that 
they are enforcing the same regulations and directives as the 
other EU countries, then it suggests that EU regulation is 
not responsible for making it more difﬁcult to do business.8 
If Denmark, and the UK and Ireland, can make doing 
business easy within the EU, why can?t Greece, Italy or 
Luxembourg? This is, however, not quite the end of the 
story. As the EU?s three most regular ?opters out?, Denmark, 
the UK and Ireland may have, or perhaps must have, grown 
accustomed to working against the EU grain. It may be 
that they have had to do so to remain ?easy places to do 
business?, and without doing so, might not have ranked so 
highly. But without further research, we may only speculate.
The conclusion to be drawn from this data is the simple 
and expected one: countries where it is easy to do business 
tend to have a lower rate of unemployment, and that most EU 
countries are not among the easiest places to do business. 
The EU as a site of foreign investment
Our third source of comparative evidence that might 
shed some light on differences between the two groups 
of countries are UNCTAD's annual reports on the ﬂow 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) into each of these 
countries during the year as well as the accumulated 
stock of FDI. However, the annual ﬂows are volatile and 
have been discussed elsewhere, so we will concentrate on 
FDI stocks, meaning the cumulative result of investment 
into each country in past years.9
This measure differs from the two previous ones in 
that we know nothing of its constituent elements, that is 
to say the priorities and criteria which guided investors? 
decisions. The measure only tells us the final result: 
when, where and how much was invested. No doubt 
investors take into account many things of no concern to 
the OECD and World Bank, or the EU, like tax rates, but 
it is unlikely that they overlook labour market institutions 
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and regulation, even though they probably evaluate them 
rather differently from OECD and World Bank surveys.
Column 3 of Table 5 lists the stock per capita of each 
country as recorded in 2010, and it will immediately 
be clear that there are vast differences among the 22 
countries.  The correlation with the rate of unemployment 
in column 2 is r-0.456, a moderately strong negative 
relationship and when the 22 are ranked ordinally, 
p-0.452. This is another not-too-surprising result. 
Countries which have received above average amounts 
of FDI tend to have lower rates of unemployment than 
those that have received below average amounts.
At ﬁrst glance, however, it does not appear that this is 
a variable that could help to explain the EU?s higher rate 
of unemployment, since the weighted means of the stock 
of FDI per capita of the EU 12 compares very favourably 
with that of the 10 independent countries $14,483 v. 
$9902 per capita. Appearances are, however, somewhat 
deceptive in this instance. The low weighted mean of 
the 10 independents is largely due to the three outliers 
-Japan, Korea and the U.S- all of which, in their different 
ways, have somewhat unusual FDI histories, leading to 
low or very low per capita rates of FDI.
Japan seems never to have quite recovered from the 
antipathy towards foreign investment that followed the 
pilot FDIs in the early years of the Meiji Restoration. 
FDI is either not welcome, not needed or encouraged 
or perhaps too daunting for the foreign investor. In any 
event, over the entire 42 years of UNCTAD?s annual 
returns, Japan has remained at or near the bottom of the 
rankings of both inflow and stock of FDI in industrial 
societies, usually accompanied by Korea. In the past 
decade or so, both countries have begun to encourage 
FDI, as may be seen from their rankings in the World 
Bank ease of doing business in Table 3. It will, however, 
be a long time before either of them approach the levels 
of FDI stock found across Europe.
Oddly enough, the U.S., though now the world's top 
recipient of FDI in absolute terms, is also a relative 
newcomer.  During its industrialization, and all the way 
through it, the U.S. imported of labour from Europe 
rather than capital, and much of the stock of FDI 
accumulated by European investors, and especially 
British investors, was eliminated, one way or another, 
during World War II. For several decades thereafter, the 
US was seen as, and saw itself as, solely as an exporter of 
capital and rarely as an importer. Substantial inﬂows of 
FDI from diverse sources are therefore relatively recent. 
They were led by the Japanese in the 1980s, though given 
the size of the U.S. economy, it will take several more 
decades of active encouragement of FDI to equal the per 
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Unemp 
Rate Mean 
2000-2010
World Bank 
Ease of Biz 
rank of 183
Singapore 2.6 1
Korea 3.63 8
Japan 4.68 20
NZ 4.89 3
Australia 5.46 15
US 5.91 4
Canada 7.08 13
Norway 3.59 6
Iceland 3.62 9
Switzerland 3.66 26
???????????????? ????
??????????????? ????
Netherlands 3.82 31
Luxembourg 3.94 50
Denmark 4.85 5
UK 5.52 7
Ireland 6.10 10
Portugal 6.99 30
Belgium 7.65 28
Italy 8.11 87
Germany 8.73 19
France 8.75 29
Greece 9.85 100
Spain 12.11 44
???????????????? ????
???????????????? ? ??????
? ??????
World Bank 2012 www.doingbusiness.org
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capita stock of long-standing European recipients. 
Together these three countries, Japan, Korea and the 
U.S., constitute nearly 75% of the population of the 
group of 10 independents, and it is their presence that 
makes the EU 12 compare rather favourably in terms of 
FDI. If they are removed from the calculations, the mean 
FDI stock per capita of the seven remaining independents 
jumps to $29,210, which is about double that of the EU 
12. If the comparison is conﬁned to the three European 
independent countries it increases to $56,009, which is 
almost four times the mean per capita 2010 stock of the 
EU12.  Compared either to these seven independent 
countries, or to their three European neighbours who 
have chosen to remain outside the EU, the EU 12 are 
evidently rather unattractive to foreign investors.
If we re-calculate the correlation between the rate 
of unemployment and the FDI stock per capita for the 
remaining 19 countries, it jumps to r-0.603, and in rank 
order p-0.731. This is the strongest relationship we have 
discovered thus far, and makes it reasonable to suggest 
that one reason why the seven independent countries have 
less unemployment that the EU 12 is that foreign investors 
have been willing to invest $14,527 more in every one of 
their citizens than they have been willing to invest in the 
inhabitants of the EU 12, and a fortiori, the reason why the 
three non-EU countries have still less unemployment is 
that foreign investors have been willing to invest  $41,326 
more per capita in every one of their citizens than they have 
been willing to invest in the inhabitants of the EU 12.
We have now identified two variables which are 
related to the rate of unemployment, ? ease of doing 
business? (r0.552, p0.532) and the stock of FDI (r-0.603, 
p-0.731). This immediately leads one to ask whether these 
are really two variables, or simply two measures of much 
the same things in a country?s economic environment, 
since foreign investors would probably, one guesses, 
invest most in countries where it is easy to do business. 
Surprisingly, this is not the case. They are independent 
variables, slightly related to one another but with a 
rather low negative correlation of r-0.22 or p-0.28. Their 
considerable degree of independence tells us that FDI 
decisions are inﬂuenced but not decisively determined by 
the ease of doing business, and vice versa.
This then raises the question of how well they might 
together explain the variance in the rate of unemployment 
???????????????????????????????????per capita,?????
?????per capita
Unemp 
Rate 
Mean 
2000
-2010
FDI  
stock $ 
per capita
2010
Un emp 
rank of 
19
FDI rank 
of
19
Singapore ??? 92378 1 1
Korea ???? 2637
Japan 4.68 1698
NZ 4.89 16055 8 13
Australia 5.46 22818 9 10
US 5.91 9715
Canada 7.08 16495 13 12
Norway 3.59 35189 2 8
Iceland 3.62 36769 3 6
Switzerland 3.66 69990 4 2
???????????? ???? ????
??????????? ???? ??????
??????????? ???? ??????
Netherlands 3.82 35504 5 7
Luxembourg 3.94 40102 6 5
Denmark 4.85 25081 7 9
UK 5.52 17442 10 11
Ireland 6.10 55280 11 4
Portugal 6.99 10327 12 16
Belgium 7.65 62548 14 3
Italy 8.11 5572 15 18
Germany 8.73 8192 16 17
France 8.75 15569 17 14
Greece 9.85 2954 18 19
Spain 12.11 13336 19 15
????????? ???? ?????
??????????
???????????
?? ??????
?? ??????
??????????
???????????
?? ??????
?? ??????
UNCTADStat Inward & Outward Foreign Direct Investment 
Stock, Annual 1980-2011. Luxembourg was omitted because of 
the lack of data over the period.
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in the 19 countries.  The adjusted r2 (or coefficient of 
determination) is 0.568 and the regression model is highly 
significant p<.01, meaning that ease of doing business 
ranking and FDI stock can together explain 57% per cent of 
the variance in rate of unemployment of the 19 countries. 
These two measures do in other words, take us some way to 
understanding the unemployment problem of the EU.
Conclusion: a step towards an explanation
While the comparative and historical evidence we 
have examined cannot explain the high, persistent and 
severe unemployment found within the EU, they strongly 
suggest that the regulatory and institutional environment 
of member countries has been a major contributory factor. 
The three measures we have used refer to only a part of 
that environment, which overlaps to some unknown degree 
with the much larger part for which the EU assumed prime 
responsibility since the start of the single market. It is not 
unreasonable therefore to suppose that EU regulations 
have had a similar, if not greater, effect. The hypothesis 
with which we began -that the EU is itself responsible 
for the exceptionally high rate of unemployment of its 
members- therefore receives substantial empirical support 
and additional credibility from this evidence. The EU 
therefore has a case to answer, or at the very least to 
address, by collecting the data which would measure the 
impact of its regulatory regime, and enable the hypothesis 
to be tested thoroughly.
In the course of this investigation, we have also 
learned a little more of the characteristics of long-time 
EU members that distinguish them from independent 
countries, even though we have also identified outliers 
who do not conform to the EU norm on one or other 
of the variables we have considered. On this basis we 
can piece together a collective portrait, a photo-fit of 
the EU, consisting of characteristics that we have found 
distinguish long-term EU members. 
Over the nineteen years of the single market, the 
EU countries have formed a club of high, presistent 
and severe unemployment. They have also provided 
high employment protection, in which they take great 
pride. They are not, for the most part, easy places to do 
business, and we know that over the eight years that the 
World Bank has been running its survey (2005-2012) they 
have done little or nothing to make it any easier. They are 
countries which, on the whole, foreign investors are not 
especially keen to invest in.
Finally, we know that they are not given to self-analysis 
and self-criticism, if anything they are inclined to be self-
congratulatory, to praise their own achievements. As this is 
being written, the EU is celebrating the 20th anniversary of the 
Single Market, but none of its leaders have asked themselves 
why over those 20 years we let unemployment blight the lives 
of so many EU inhabitants when independent societies have 
been able to do so much better, and why have we declined to 
collect evidence so that we, and everyone else, might try to 
understand our long-standing problem.
This final characteristic, the unwillingness to hold 
themselves to account, is perhaps the least attractive. It 
may be that factors not amenable to EU control, such 
as historical legacies, cultural preferences, and national 
political restraints, may have played a part in maintaining 
unwise employment protections and obstacles to doing 
business, as well as turning foreign investors away. 
However, the reluctance to collect and publicize the facts 
about itself, to investigate why the EU performs so badly 
compared to independent societies, and to respond to 
the wretched experience of many of  its young people, 
are in altogether different category. These are grievous 
omissions, are entirely of the EU?s own making, self-
serving and unforgivable.
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